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NOTES on talk by The Hon. Robert Amory, Jr.

Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Amory started by saying that a large part of what he had to say, perhaps 90 percent, came from publicly available sources. He said that there were literally tons of material publicly available published in Russia. The main problem was not one of obtaining secret information but of translating and evaluating publicly available information. In the recent Communist Party conference, for example, we had printed material amounting to about 900,000 words.

Correct interpretation of some events, however, was at variance with public belief. For example, the public thought that peace in Korea had resulted from our initiative; in fact, the conclusion of the armistice in Korea as well as in Indo-China was largely the result of Russia's initiative.

The conflict of views between Malenkov on the one hand and Khrushchev and Bulganin on the other were largely differences between "go slow vs. immediate". To some extent the Malenkov "go slow" set of ideas gave greater emphases to domestic questions and the present or immediate school to foreign questions. The first positive indication of a new look in Russian politics was the proposal of the Austrian Treaty in March 1955. Recently, there had been three other important changes in policy: (1) the non-evitability of war (2) the encouragement of Popular Fronts in foreign countries and (3) the obliteration of Stalin.

The four most important people in Russia today are Khrushchev,

Bulganin, Mikoyan and Kaganovich. If these four cannot agree on policy, the Central Committee is the body which reaches the final decision. The elimination of Beria could have been predicted because any leading Russian official who wanted to increase his power would have to have the cooperation of the head of the secret police; hence, Beria represented a dangerous element and all could agree to his elimination.

It had been reported that when the Malenkov question was discussed before the Central Committee he stalked out in a rage and consequently was demoted. On the occasion when reconciliation with Yugoslavia was discussed, Molotov did not agree but accepted the decision gracefully and was permitted to keep his position.

The Army should not be considered a separate force and unquestionably is under the control of the Party.

The Russian system permits very quick decisions. There is some evidence to suggest that the possibility of selling arms to Egypt did not originate in Russia. The evidence suggests that after the first tentative proposal was made the leaders had reached a decision within one week; in contrast, the United States had known of Egypt's desire for arms and the Russian offer for six or seven months before the information was public but no decision could be reached as to what measures should be taken.

One of the outstanding accomplishments of the Soviet's economic system has been the transfer of twenty million people from farms to factories within a decade. About 28 percent of gross national product is going to gross investment in contrast with about less than 16 percent in the United States. At the present time the industrial production (output of mines and factories but excluding power and transportation)

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of Russia is about 28 percent of that in the United States. In terms of 1951 prices, the 1955 output in the United States was 138 billion and the U.S.S.R. was 39 billion. In 1950 the corresponding figures were 111 billion and 23 billion. Projecting the trends into the future, based upon the changes from 1950 to 1955, shows that Russian industrial production will equal that of the United States in 1975. Russia, at the present time, is producing about 80 percent as many producers' goods as is the United States. The output of units of machine tools is greater in Russia today than in the United States. The goals which Stalin announced in 1946 for 1960 in fact were reached in 1954. The average work week in Russia is about 46 hours. We know that Russia has a ten billion electron volt cyclotron (atom smasher - whether called cyclotron, cosmotron or by some other name). The largest in the United States is, I believe, about two billion electron volts. Russia is well ahead of the United States in the use of nuclear power which, according to present plans, will be three times as great in Russia in 1960 as in the United States.

Russia also appears to be ahead of the United States in education. Engineer graduates in Russia amount to about 130,000 a year versus 72,000 here. Graduates of the Ph.D. equivalent amount to about 8,100 annually in Russia versus 5,000 in the United States. Figures were also given about the greater amount of mathematics, physics and other engineering subjects which are given to Russian students. In conversation after the talk Mr. Amory mentioned that last year there were just over 100 students in the United States - graduated - who could speak Russian; in Russia there were more than 32,000 graduates who could speak broken English.

Under the heading of "military" Mr. Amory said that he did not think that world war was any immediate threat. Russia probably did not have a 1,500 mile missile but probably were ahead of us in the missile field. There was no evidence that the Russian economy was on a war basis or organized as it would be if war was contemplated in the immediate future. The percent of Russian population was approximately 1.6 in contrast to the United States percentage of 1.8. A reason for doubting any immediate war was that Russia appears to be doing quite well without war.

China might not try and grab some small area but this did not seem too likely. China had given comparatively little direct help to Ho-Chin Minh troops in Northern Viet Nam. China had never delivered more than 3,000 tons of supply a month, when for many months we delivered not less than 100,000 tons each month. It seems doubtful if either Russia or China were really interested in increased acreage; if Communism could not be made successfully with 900 million people, there would be no reason to believe that it would be successful with one billion. Russia might be really serious about disarmament for the economic advantages it would hold. The present program for Russia was more subtle, more dangerous to us and more difficult to combat successfully than would be military aggression.

Russia was decidedly strong in resources with exception of fertile land and cork. For the last three years Russia had been a net exporter of oil.

It was a mistake, Mr. Amory stated, for the United States to think that the Russian worker could be called slave labor. It was about as easy to change jobs in Russia, he stated, as in the United States, in the United States, pensions, etc. being the deterrence to changing jobs.